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Abstract: The Syrian Civil War has claimed at least two hundred thousand lives, with over four 
million people having now fled Syria. Of those, about six hundred thousand have registered with 
the UNHCR in Jordan, with an estimated eighty thousand others living in Jordan’s Zaatari Camp. 
In view of the foregoing, this research attempts to analyze the vulnerability of Syrian Refugees 
living in Jordan in two very different environments: the Zaatari Camp and non-camp 
communities. We conduct a covariate matching analysis to compare the differences in 
socioeconomic conditions and well-being among the heads of Syrian households. Our results 
suggest that notwithstanding the limited labor opportunities for Syrian families within Zaatari 
Camp, the variety and quality of attentions within the camp environment provides a platform 
that helps them cope with some of the uncertainties and challenges caused by the displacement 
from their country of origin, while they seek full reintegration in Jordan.  
	
The author wish to thank Fatima Bukhamseen and Dr. Ayat Nashwan. Our research assistants in Zaatari 
Camp: Marwan, Rami, Ahmed, Khaled and Tarek. Our research assistants in Irbid: Ibrahim and Hosam. And 
all the people from the NGOs that gave us their support during our field research project in Jordan. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Since the Syrian Civil War started in 2011, nearly six and a half million Syrians have fled from 
their cities of origin seeking refuge in the neighboring countries and within Syria itself. 
Approximately six million Syrians have been internally displaced, and about five million have 
fled to Turkey, Lebanon, Iraq, Egypt and Jordan (Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan, 2016). 
Even though the end of the Syrian civil war is the only true solution to the Syrian Refugee 
Crisis, the difficulties that the host communities and the refugee communities face, require 
solutions that help, to both, mitigate the impact of the increasing waves of Syrian refugees 
into the region, and prevent a further deterioration in the living conditions of the refugee and 
host community.  
 
Regional Response 
 
In December of 2012, the governments of the aforementioned neighboring countries 
partnered with more than 200 agencies to launch the first Regional Response Plan. The plan 
was aimed at designing and implementing programs to prevent large numbers of Syrian 
families from falling into poverty and alleviating the suffering of the most vulnerable families 
(Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan, 2016). Jordan is one of the few countries in the middle 
east that do not have any major internal conflict since the eruption of the Arab Spring 
(Carrion, 2015). Jordan’s political stability, coupled with its proximity to Syria has made it 
one of the countries most populated by Syrian refugees since the breakout of the Syrian Civil 
War.  By 2015, more than six thousand Syrians registered with the UNHCR in Jordan. 
However, there is evidence that there are hundreds of thousands of Syrians living in Jordan 
that have not yet registered with the UNHCR. In fact, the Syrian population in Jordan 
accounts for ten percent of the total population of this country before the breakout of the 
Syrian Civil War (Amnestry International, 2013).  
 
Jordan 
 
Within Jordan, Syrian families live in two different environments, the Refugee Camp 
communities and the non-camp communities. The main difference between these two 
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environments is that the non-camp communities offer access to Jordan’s labor markets, 
thereby granting them direct contact with the host community. The Refugees Camps in 
contrast, offer treatments and programs to reduce the vulnerability of Syrian families in a 
precluded environment where only Syrians are allowed to live. As of today, most of the Syrian 
families in Jordan live in non-camp communities, facing a situation of instability caused by 
both, the variation in the humanitarian stance of the Jordanian Government and the increase 
in the demand for development opportunities by the continuous waves of Syrian families 
(Achilli, 2015). 
 
In Jordan, there are five refugee camps for Syrians: Zaatari, Azraq, King Abdullah Park, Cyber 
City and Zarqa. The Zaatari Refugee Camp, which opened in July of 2012 is the largest and 
most well-known refugee camp and has turned into the second largest refugee camp in the 
world (Ledwith, Zaatari: The Instant City , 2014). Zaatari Camp is managed by both the 
Jordanian Government and the UNHCR. The NGOs that work in conjunction with the 
UNCHR provide aid programs for the Syrian families, defining five strategic priorities: 
protection, health, basic needs and livelihoods, education and sanitation. The Jordanian 
Government in contrast, oversees security provision services in the camp, while also monitors 
access to the camp (UNCHR, 2017). Since the Zaatari Camp was established, at least four-
hundred thousand refugees have lived there at some point. At the moment, around eight 
thousand refugees reside within the twelve districts of the camp. The Zaatari Camp stopped 
accepting new arrivals in April 2014 when Azraq Camp was established, allowing the 
organizations to diagnose the most urgent needs on the existing population, define priorities 
and design interventions according to these needs (REGIONAL REFUGEE & RESILIENCE 
PLAN, 2016). 
 
Zaatari Camp 
 
The organizations that work in the Zaatari Camp registers all refugees upon arrival in the 
camp, with the documents paving way for the refugees to access assistance from these 
organizations. In September of 2013, they started to provide a voucher of U.S $8.50 that have 
been distributed twice a week, while other agencies such as the World Food Program provide 
free food on a weekly basis. In terms of education opportunities, the NGO’s are responsible 
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for the construction of schools, while classes are taught by Jordanian teachers that are 
sometimes assisted by Syrian teachers (Ledwith, Zaatari: The Instant City, 2014).  
 
In terms of employment opportunities, the UNHCR’s 2014 report estimated an employment 
rate of sixty-five percent in the camp, with most of the employment opportunities in the camps 
being created by business initiatives of the Syrian families. Furthermore, the working group 
of organizations have been able to employ just fifteen-hundred refugees at an hourly wage of 
U.S. $1.40.  
 
Syrian families that were living in the camp had the opportunity to move to urban areas in 
Jordan through a bailout permit that was granted, conditional on the refugee receiving a 
sponsorship from a Jordanian citizen and subsequent payment of the corresponding fee. After 
November of 2014, the Jordanian Government started to reinforce this policy by denying 
these documents to those refugees that left the camp illegally, with some of the refugees sent 
back to the camps, thus restricting the possibility to move to non-camp communities (Francis, 
2015). Additionally, the situation in non-camp communities does not necessarily represent a 
better environment for Syrian families. The Syrian Refugee Crisis aggravates the ongoing 
refugee crisis that Jordan has faced for more than seventy years, hosting the second largest 
share of refugees in the world (Francis, 2015).With the protracted conflict in Syria and a 
persistent underfunded humanitarian assistance, the Jordanian Government had continued to 
implement restrictions to those policies that were intended to provide protection to Syrian 
families in non-camp communities (Francis, 2015).  
 
Non-camp Communities 
 
The Jordanian Government has maintained a humanitarian stance towards Syrian refugees, 
however, this stance started to weaken in 2014 due to several reasons, such as, meager 
resources, lack of employment and the large increase of the population of refugees in the urban 
areas since 2013 due to the aggravation of the war. As of 2015, all non-Jordanian with legal 
residency need to have a work permit that can only be issued if the employer pays a fee and 
proves that the prospective job requires skills that cannot be found in the Jordanian labor 
markets.  According to the UNHCR’s 2014 surveys, only 1% of Syrian households visited had 
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a member who possessed a work permit in Jordan, as a consequence, 47% of Syrian households’ 
paid employment come from children and 45% of Syrian refugees living in Jordan have faced 
protracted displacement lasting more than five years (Achilli, 2015).  
 
Jordan is a relatively young country and even though it is not a signatory country of the 1951 
Refugee Convention or it’s 1967 Protocol (International Labor Organization, 2015), it has 
been hosting refugees since 1950, after the creation of the Israeli State. It has faced two refugee 
crises in the last decade and its constitution prohibits the refoulement of political refugees 
(Chatelard, 2010). As a matter of fact, the only directive in Jordan in regards of refugees, is 
the 1998 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), which allows the UNHCR to determine 
refugee status of asylum seekers. However, Jordanian labor laws do not protect workers that 
are going through a vulnerable situation such as refugees and asylum seekers (International 
Labor Organization, 2015). In practice, due to the fact that most of the Syrians that are living 
in Jordan came from rural areas, most of them have skill sets that are more useful in farming 
related jobs. Therefore, they often compete with the low-skilled Jordanian workers in the 
labor markets, thus increasing the probability of their work permits being frequently denied, 
and consequently leaving them with a solitary choice of working in the informal sector 
without protection (International Labor Organization, 2015).  
 
More so, the refugees are mandated to obtain a UNHCR asylum seeker certificate and a 
Ministry of Interior card to access assistance and public services in non-camp communities. 
For instance, the Jordanian Government allows the Syrian children to receive public 
education. However, there has been an increase in the enforcement of restrictions to obtain 
these legal documents. As matter of fact, post November 2014 witnessed the emergence of 
Syrian families losing access to subsidized public health services. Due to consequence of the 
lack of obligations under the international law, the refugee communities in Jordan may be 
susceptible to some legally vulnerable conditions. (Francis, 2015).  
 
The stance of Jordan towards the numerous refugee crises in the region are tightly 
intertwined with its political and economic goals as an upper-middle income country that is 
poorly endowed with natural resources in the context of the Arab World (Chatelard, 2010). 
Before the breakout of the Syrian Civil War, Jordan was already facing an economic crisis due 
 5 
to the uprising in different Arabic countries. The Jordanian economy has always been 
dependent of on economies in the Middle East, with the uprisings in different Arabic countries 
considerably affecting the levels of importable goods to Jordan (Francis, 2015). Generally, the 
past six years has been conspicuous for significantly decreased levels of humanitarian aid and 
an increasing burden of the Refugee Crisis on the Jordanian Government. Additionally, the 
very few resources that the Syrian families were able to bring to Jordan have been totally 
depleted or substantially reduced. As result, Syrian families are increasingly reliant on more 
daily assistance or negative coping mechanism.  
 
It is then in our interest to determine which environment is best suited for Syrian families to 
reduce their vulnerability and if it is even possible to restore their previous socioeconomics 
conditions. We conducted a comparative analysis of Syrian families living in non-camp 
communities and the Zaatari Camp. Through matching techniques, we were able to match 
Syrian families based on their previous socioeconomic conditions to control for the effect they 
may have on their current socioeconomic conditions and leaving their place of residence in 
Jordan as main factor that affects their ability to reduce their vulnerability and restore their 
livelihoods. Therefore, the main question we are attempting to answer in this research is: Are 
Syrian families living in non-camp communities less vulnerable than those living in camp 
communities? Our results suggest that even though Syrian families living in non-camp 
communities are less likely to experience an income shock, when they face an income shock 
they would be less likely to fall under negative coping mechanisms.  
 
Even though there is not an actual policy that leads to the reintegration of the Syrian 
Refugees, the closest status to reintegration has been the option of living in non-camp 
communities. Through matching techniques, we attempt to measure the effect of living in 
non-camp communities as a proxy for reintegration. In view of the foregoing, we employ non-
camp communities as a proxy for reintegration. It is also important to mention that our results 
are applied only to Syrian refugees living in Zaatari Camp and cannot be used to draw any 
conclusions about the situation of the Syrian refugees that live in the rest of the Jordanian 
refugee camps. 
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2. Literature Review 
 
2.1 Refugees, displacement and migration 
  
According to the United Nations Organization, International Migrants are all those who are 
living outside of their country of origin, regardless of their motives to move. In that sense, 
international migrants are those who have voluntarily moved across international borders. 
Displacement refers to that situation in which people are forced to move from their places of 
origin, due to armed conflict or natural disasters. Refugees, according to the 1951 United 
Nations Refugee Convention and the 1967 protocol, are all those people who escape from their 
country of origin, due to a legitimate fear of persecution driven by causes such as, race, 
religion, nationality, cultural identity or political opinion. In addition, refugee conventions, 
such as the 1969 Organizations of the African Unity Convention and 1984 Cartagena 
Declaration, define refugees as those people who have left their countries of origin for reasons 
of external aggression and foreign occupation (International Labor Organization, 2015).  
 
It is important to mention, that although there are different motives for moving out of one’s 
country of origin, often times people face the same risk, whether they emigrated from 
countries of dire situations or for economic opportunity. In some situations, they might be 
equally vulnerable to particular difficulties in their pursuit of improving upon their previous 
living conditions. Moreover, (Cernea, 2000) argue that there are two types of policies in 
regards to reintegration. For agencies such as the World Bank, a successful reintegration is 
one that not only restores the previous living conditions of migrants, but also, if possible, 
improves their previous situation. In contrast, the UNHCR, argues that reintegration is not 
successful in improving the situation of migrants until they are successfully repatriated in 
their countries of origin.   
 
In this regard, we consider appropriate to cover to some extent literature related to migration; 
and even more, because in our interviews we identify some Syrian families that had a situation 
more similar to a labor migrant than a refugee. Those families decided to move to Jordan in 
the very beginning of the Syrian conflict, but their main intentions were to preserve and 
protect the well-established business partnerships they had in Jordan. Some of these families, 
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in fact noted that their socioeconomic conditions improved or did not change at all following 
the breakout of the Syrian Civil War. 
 
2.2 Migration Theories 
 
International migration theories have tried to explain migration by putting different relevance 
on the factors that are taken into account by migrants at a micro-level and those that govern 
the international dynamics of migration. The Neoclassic economic theory argues that families 
are income maximizing units that compare wages and employment conditions between 
countries and their corresponding migration costs. The New Economics of Migration goes 
further by expanding the analysis of the conditions outside the labor markets and 
conceptualizing migration as the decision to minimize risk and overcome capital constraints 
for production activities. In contrast, the Dual Labor Market Theory and the World System 
Theory do not consider microeconomic dynamics, but instead focus their attention on macro-
level behaviors. The Dual Labor Market Theory establishes a strong causal relationship of 
migration with the current structural demands of the industrial economies, while the World 
System Theory uses a conceptualization of migration that is a result of the penetration of 
markets at an international level. 
 
Even though these theories have differences in their identification of factors that influence the 
patterns of migration, they are not necessarily mutually exclusive to each other. Rather, these 
theories together can explain the decision taken on a micro-level within the household, and 
the structural forces that governs the labor markets at a national and international level 
(Douglas S. Massey, 1993).  
 
Micro-theory of Migration  
 
In the micro-level theory proposed by (Todaro, 1969) and (Sjaastad, 1962), the decision of 
migrating is driven by a cost-benefit calculation, based on their estimation of the expected 
discount net returns.  
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The expected net return to migration is estimated at the moment before the departure, and it 
depends on the probability of not being deported, the probability of finding a job, the income 
earned if the migrant finds a job, the probability of having a job in the country of origin, the 
income earned if the migrant has a job in the country of origin, and the total amount of costs 
of migration.  
  
In this model, migrants will actually migrate if the expected net returns are greater in the 
potential destination, contrasted with those from the place of origin.  Human capital 
characteristics determine the probability of having greater expected return in the potential 
destination, technologies can reduce the cost of migration and, again, other markets do not 
influence the decision of migrating.    
 
Migration in the context of the Syrian Refugee Crisis is a privilege, however as mentioned 
before, some of the Syrian families from our sample made their decision to move to Jordan 
based on a cost-benefit calculation. Further, evidence suggests that some of the refugees have 
migrated multiple times within the Jordanian borders six years after their original migration 
to the country. Thus, some refugees migrated from the urban areas to the refugee camps and 
vice versa, despite the restrictions implemented by the Jordanian Government, with their 
decisions to migrate being highly influenced by cost-benefit calculations.  
 
The New Economics of Migration 
 
The New Economics of Migration, proposed by (Stark, 1984) and (Bloom, 1985), looks at a 
comparative novel concept of migration, since it suggest that migration decisions are not 
decisions taken by individuals, but by groups of people that are in some way related to each 
other. In this way, migrants are able to minimize even more of the expected risks and break 
the constraints they have to face because of market discrepancies. In this model, differences in 
wages between countries do not influence the decision of migrating. Governments can 
promote migration by implementing restrictions in the capital and insurance markets and not 
only through changes in the labor markets, but also by making changes in the income 
distribution.   
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For instance, most of the people in our sample came from the Governorate of Daraa, this is 
because of two things. First, Daraa is considered one of the first places where the Syrian Civil 
War started. Second, Daraa is very close to the Jordanian borders. However, we also found 
people from northern Governorates of Syria in our sample. Most of the families from these 
places, however, decided to move because they already had existing social networks in Jordan.    
 
2.3 Refugee Theories   
 
As opposed to migrants, refugees are not living in a foreign country by choice. This fact affects 
their well-being and should be considered by policy makers in host communities. In this 
section, we will go over the literature focused on the general characteristics of refugees to 
identify those aspects that affect their well-being in the host communities. Furthermore, as 
our goal is to analyze the situation of the Syrian refugees, we attempt to develop an 
understanding of refugee camps in host countries.   
 
Refugees: before and after their journey 
 
As stated by (Kunz, 1973), there are two types of mobility of refugees, anticipatory refugee 
movement and acute refugee movement. An anticipatory refugee is one who perceives the 
start of a new period with an increase of danger at an early stage, maybe even before a potential 
crisis occurs. For this type of refugee, the process of departure from their place of origin is 
similar to the process that a voluntary migrant has to go through. Since they are able to 
prepare for the departure, they are also able to bring resources and travel with the entire 
family unit. In contrast, acute refugee movement is produce by a sudden shock that pushes 
people to flee. This shock can be the start of a war, new policies and also the propagation of 
panic. In this kind of situation, refugees do not have any plan or strategy to leave their place 
of origin. In other words, the urgency to escape is greater, and the decision to flee is mainly 
based on an attempt to prevent any harm and not exactly the pursuit of a better future.  
 
In this context, it is imperative to note that these two types of refugees differ in more ways 
than their mere socioeconomic and demographic conditions. Anticipatory refugees are often 
well educated and have better socioeconomic conditions than those with acute movements. 
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Psychological characteristics, age and the changes in the environment of the place of origin 
also play a key role on the timeframe under which refugees decide to leave their country. As 
mentioned before, within our sample, we find refugees that were able to anticipate the 
breakout of the Syrian Civil War and their decision to migrate to Jordan was according to a 
labor migrant. In the same way, these refugees had on average better socioeconomic 
conditions than those who did not anticipate the sudden shock of the war.  
 
Hence, refugees should not be considered as a homogenous group, there is certainly 
heterogeneity present within and between these groups. Over time, refugees that migrated in 
the early stages might be very different from those that migrated later. (Kunz, 1973), argues 
that hosting societies should be aware of the heterogeneity of these groups, especially on their 
perception of threat and danger. Thus, there is an obvious difference between anticipatory and 
acute refugees. While anticipatory are able to perceive and respond earlier to danger, some 
acute refugees may have been less risk averse and be reluctant to leave at an early stage. 
(Keller, 1975), also shows evidence that those who leave in the later stages are more likely to 
have feelings of guilt, vulnerability and aggressiveness.  
 
Furthermore, regardless of the type of refugee, (Kunz, 1973) identifies four stages of the 
process of adjustment for a refugee: the initial arrival period of the first few months, the first 
and second years, the next four to five years and a decade or more. In the first stage, refugees 
will have to get used to a new reality and their living conditions will decrease noticeably. 
During the second stage, refugees tend to exhibit improvements and even the restoration of 
their previous living conditions. Refugees are often able to change jobs, continue with their 
education and move to an area that is more densely populated by fellow refugees. In the third 
stage, refugees have accomplished most of the possible restoration, which can result in an 
increase of feelings of resignation, since at this stage they are more aware of the potential 
success that they have at the hosting community. By the fourth stage, the family unit has 
achieved certain stability, however, most of the time the final outcome for refugees within the 
community is a lower status compared to the local population.  
 
Because the Syrian Civil War has lasted six years, we were only able to observe the effects of 
the first three stages in the conditions of the refugees. In general, we observed that the date 
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of arrival to Jordan is an important factor to take into account in our analysis. Those families 
that have lived in Jordan the longest have achieved most of the possible restoration. 
Furthermore, as shown by (Azevedo, 2016), most of the Syrian Refugees reintegrated in 
Turkey have been able to improve their socioeconomic conditions over the span of four years 
without significant impact on the poverty rates of the hosting country, notwithstanding the 
high poverty rates that was hitherto prevalent among the refugees. Analogous to their 
Turkish counterparts, most of the Syrian Refugees’ heads of household in our sample were 
employed in the informal sector, in this scenario the impact that the refugee communities can 
have on the labor markets may not be negative or at best, it would not be significant. 
 
(Verwimp, 2015) on the other hand, argues that it is important and imperative to put more 
emphasis on the situation of the country of origin of the refugees. Since many of the challenges 
faced by the host country are intrinsically related with conditions faced by those refugees that 
were able to go back to their countries of origin. In other words, the increase or decrease of 
the refugee population in the neighboring countries is highly related with the intensity of the 
crisis or conflict in their country of origin. For instance, the Syrian Refugee Crisis in Jordan 
is not only a result of the Syrian Civil War, but also a consequence of the uprisings in different 
Arab countries and their corresponding refugee crisis. The humanitarian stance in Jordan not 
only respond to the urgent needs of developing opportunities for the Syrian Refugees, but also 
to maintain in some way the stability in the region.  
 
Refugee camps 
 
In some of the hosting countries such as Jordan, there are two types of environment for 
refugees, non-camp and camp communities. In the refugee camps as defined by (Murphy, 
1955), refugees tend to realize what they have lost, even though the isolation of this 
environment from the hosting society gives them a feeling of independence and allow for the 
provision of treatments and interventions that are specially designed to ameliorate their 
traumas and facilitate basic goods and services. As mentioned before, Zaatari Camp is an 
environment design to reduce the vulnerability of Syrian Refugees through the access to the 
programs of the organizations and institutions that work in the camp. 
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Some of the refugee camps can have internal goods and labor markets as posited by (Werker, 
2007), who identified the main characteristics of the markets in the camps. Most of the markets 
allocated inside the refugee camps tend to have access to the commercial networks of the host 
country, the production is mainly agricultural, there are several businesses, but they are of 
small size. There is a commercial area where most of the business are concentrated and the 
only source of restriction for these markets are the policies implemented by the host country. 
In the case of the Zaatari Camp, there are two main sources of employment, the business 
started by the refugees and the jobs offered by the NGOs to those refugees with better labor 
skills.  
 
(Werker, 2007), also emphasizes the importance of the humanitarian assistance from 
international organization in fulfilling the basic need of refugees. He also highlights that in 
the context where the host country and the international organizations are not able to provide 
basic needs for refugees in an isolated environment, refugees tend to seek for development 
alternatives outside the refugee camps, regardless of the risks that this might imply. In Zaatari 
Camp, the limited labor opportunities offered by the camp can offer means that many heads of 
households escape every day from the camp to seek jobs in the neighboring towns despite, 
notwithstanding the risk of being caught by the Jordanian authorities. 
 
Reintegration trough Resettlement 
 
After their experience in the refugee camps, the refugees discover a new land with mixed 
feelings of hope and trauma. As stated by (Stein, 1981), refugees have great expectations of 
the opportunities offered by the hosting society, chief among them being the recovery of their 
previous socio-economic condition. However, the reality is that developing countries are 
hosting most of the refugee population in the world, hence, the governments of the host 
countries are most often unable to cover the needs of the refugee population and rely on the 
support of international organizations to provide the required assistance. Refugees also face 
difficulties to adapt their patterns of behavior, and sometime fail to allocate his resources in a 
new economic structure.  
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(Stein, 1981) also argues that there are three basic elements in the analysis of reintegration: 
the first is the model of reintegration; the second is the refugee community and its ethnic 
characteristics; and the third is the nature of the reintegration process. Furthermore, (Gordon, 
1964), defines three models of assimilation: First, the host-conformity model which states that 
refugees must adapt their behavior in order to behave just like the native citizens. Second, the 
“melting pot” model, which defines reintegration as a process in which native and refugee 
population merge into a new and better community. Finally, the cultural pluralism, in which 
refugees adopt certain patterns of behavior but also preserve the mainly aspects of their 
culture.  
 
Lastly, reintegration as defined by (Eisenstadt, 1953), consists in four stages: first, the 
adoption of language, norms and customs; second, the learning process of knowing how to 
behave in the environment; third the creation of a new identity; and fourth the increase in the 
participation in the institutions of the hosting society.  
 
2.4 Vulnerability as the risk to be poor 
 
As stated by (Cernea, 2000), a successful experience of reintegration is one that allow the 
targeted population to not only restore their previous socioeconomic conditions, but also, if 
possible, to improve them in the host society. Jordan, as an upper-middle income country 
(where refugees represents more than 20% of the population), has increasing limitations to 
guarantee the restoration of the previous socioeconomic conditions of Syrian Refugees. In fact, 
most of the Syrian refugees do not have enough economic resources to cover their basic needs. 
In this section, we attempt to provide an overview of multidimensional concepts of poverty 
and vulnerability.  
 
Poverty 
 
In general, poverty is considered as a deficit in the physical and mental well-being of individual 
produced by a lack of resources (Peña, In press). This basic and general understanding of 
poverty implies that there must be a certain threshold that determines what levels of material 
resources assure physical and mental well-being. One of the first efforts to measure poverty 
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using a certain threshold was conducted by (Booth, 1889), where he classified poor and non-
poor people depending on whether or not their income surpassed a certain threshold. 
Nowadays, poverty is generally classified as having less than a certain threshold, having less 
than others and the feeling of lacking enough material resources to live (Hagenaars, 1988). 
But these general concepts of poverty have been criticized because they do not take into 
account the multidimensional nature of poverty. For instance, (Sen, 1981), argues that these 
conceptualizations do not take into account the presence of heterogeneity among people. In 
addition, there is evidence of the difficulties that come from determining a minimum of 
material resources and an adequate basket that guarantees a proper level of well-being.  
 
Vulnerability 
 
Vulnerability, defined within the framework of poverty alleviation proposed by (Chaudhuri, 
2002), is considered as the risk that a non-poor household will fall under the poverty line, or 
the risk that a poor household will remain poor. (Cunningham, 2000), on the other hand, define 
vulnerability as the level of exposure to adverse shocks that reduce welfare taking into account 
the initial distribution of welfare. Furthermore, (Deaton, 1992 ), argues that vulnerability 
depends on factors such as, wealth, current income, expected income and the ability to 
maintain the same levels of consumption in the occurrence of income shocks.  
 
In general, in the models described above it is necessary to know the expected levels of 
consumption in different time periods of the same population. However, as pointed out by 
(Chaudhuri, 2002), it is difficult to compile data of such quality. In contrast, cross-sectional 
household surveys are more common. Therefore, (Chaudhuri, 2002), proposes a modification 
of the general concept of vulnerability that can be analyze with cross-sectional data allowing 
for analysis and estimations that are equally accurate, this modification makes assumptions 
related to the unobservable heterogeneity in the future levels of consumption for households 
that are essentially identical. These assumptions are summarized in the following equation: 
(1) 𝑙𝑛𝐶ℎ = 𝑋ℎ𝐵 + 𝐸ℎ 
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Where Ch is per capita consumption expenditure, Xh is a set of observable household 
characteristics, B is a vector of parameters and Eh is a disturbance terms with a mean zero that 
captures shocks that determine the difference in the consumptions levels for households that 
are essentially identical. Therefore, this equation assumes that there are not unexpected 
structural changes in the economy and that the change in the levels of consumption depends 
solely on the unpredictable idiosyncratic shocks at a household level. 
 
3. Methodology 
 
3.1 The Data 
 
The data collection was executed through a firsthand survey (Appendix 41), that was 
administered from May to July of 2016 using heads of households from Syrian families living 
in Jordan. We ran a pilot over a period of three weeks to adapt our survey to the specific 
situation of the Syrian refugees and interviewed refugee families from Iraq and The Palestine 
living in non-camp and camp communities for comparison.  
 
In the first phase of the data collection process, we conducted surveys in the Jordanian cities 
with higher presence of Syrian families, such as, Amman, Irbid, Zarqa and Al-Mafraq. In the 
second phase, we conducted surveys in Zaatari Refugee Camp. In the latter phase, we were 
able to make our sample selection through stratified random sampling. With the support of 
the UNHCR, we had access to a list of the families that live in the camp, including their 
identification number and the district in which they lived. From this list, we randomly selected 
25 families from each of the 12 districts of Zaatari Refugee Camp.  
 
The survey used in this research is divided into eight sections. The first section captures the 
demographic characteristics of the family unit in Jordan. The second section captures the 
composition of the family unit in Jordan. The third section contains information about the 
different environments where the Syrian families have lived, with keen interest in knowing 
their main dwellings dating back to their arrival. The fourth section captures the level of 
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wealth that the Syrian families used to have in Syria and the level of wealth they have in 
Jordan. The fifth section contains questions about the levels of income, expenses, employment 
status and labor conditions in both Jordan and Syria. The sixth section captures their 
psychological well-being in terms of happiness and optimism. The seventh section captures 
the perceived situation of security of the heads of household in both Jordan and Syria. The 
eighth section captures the presence of income shocks and the adoption of vulnerable coping 
behaviors by the family in the last month.  
 
3.2 Selection into non-camp and camp communities 
 
Since the start of the civil war in 2011, those Syrian families that attempted to access Jordan 
through formal borders were registered with the UNHCR and then transferred to one of the 
refugee camps in Jordan. In contrast, those families that attempted to access Jordan through 
non-formal borders we are able to resettle in those places where their social networks were 
numerous. This suggest that the main differences between families living in Zaatari Camp and 
non-camp communities were the route they chose to access Jordan, therefore, selection into 
non-camp communities is mainly influenced by the route to access Jordan and by their 
socioeconomic and demographic characteristics in a lower degree (Achilli, 2015). 
 
The reintegration of Syrian families in non-camp communities is not a process that is 
conducted through random selection. This process is influenced by factors, such as, proximity 
to Jordanian borders, social networks and socioeconomic conditions. There is no actual policy 
that has been administered to randomly determine whether refugees must live in Zaatari 
Camp or non-camp communities. Therefore, our research uses observational data rather than 
experimental data to make a comparative analysis of the families that are currently living in 
the Zaatari Camp and those that live in the Jordanian communities.  
 
The particular features of the Syrian families required a close examination of the differences 
in their previous characteristics between families that are living in both environments. In 
order to be able to use matching techniques, we need to make the assumption that the factors 
that influence the process by which Syrian families end up being reintegrated in Jordanian 
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communities are orthogonal to the potential outcomes obtained as a result of being 
reintegrated (non-camp communities).  This is the ignorability assumption required for 
matching estimations to identify and measure the result that are strictly a consequence of the 
treatment. At this point, it is imperative to note that in the absence of a formal policy to ensure 
complete reintegration of the Syrian refugees, we employ non-camp communities as a proxy 
for formal reintegration. Due to fact that there are families that have undergone transition 
from non-camp communities to camp communities and vice-versa, we are careful to constrain 
our population to those families that have been living under their current status for at least 
one more year than the previous status, in order to analyze more accurately the impact of 
reintegration in Jordanian communities.  
 
For methodology purposes our main population was divided into control and treatment 
groups. The control group correspond to Zaatari Camp refugees, whereas the treatment group 
is presented in terms of the non-camp refugees as a proxy for formally reintegrated refugees. 
The total observations obtained for the control group were 134, and for the treatment groups 
we obtained a total of 250 observations. Our final data is a cross-section of both information 
about the previous living conditions of the Syrian families prior to their departure from Syria 
and their current living conditions in Jordan.      
 
3.3 Identification Strategy 
 
The evaluation of the impact of reintegration requires the identification of a control group 
that works as good as a randomly selected group. This allow us to make a comparative analysis 
with the Syrian families that are reintegrated and those that live in Zaatari Camp. 
 
In this research, we use the Covariate Matching Method (CVM), and Propensity Score 
Matching (PSM), with Probit estimations employed as further robustness checks. Covariate 
matching identifies the nearest Euclidean distance between an observation in the treatment 
and control. Propensity score matching identifies the probability of an observation being part 
of the treatment group, resulting from a probit estimation that measures the propensity to be 
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part of the treatment group, creating matches between one observation of the treatment group 
and one observation in the control group with a similar propensity score (Imbens, 2004).   
 
In order to measure the effect of reintegration for those that have been reintegrated without 
any potential source of bias, we need to make two assumptions. First, the conditional 
independence assumption (ignorability) which suggests in this case, that the previous 
socioeconomic conditions do not have any effect on the final outcomes. And second, that there 
is an overlap between the treatment and control groups (assumption of common support) 
(Imbens, 2004). 
 
3.4 The Model 
 
Matching covariates (independent variables) are presented in Table 1. We use education level 
of the head of household, place of origin, total time under current status, type of job, age and 
gender of the head of the household and family size. Furthermore, we analyze outcomes 
(dependent variables) that are divided in seven sets.   
 
These dependent variables are summarized in Table 2. With the first set, we analyze the levels 
of income and expenses in Jordan. With the second set, we explore the quality of labor 
opportunities. While the third set estimates the restoration of wealth based on the possession 
of durables assets. With the fourth section investigating the likelihood of experiencing shocks 
in Jordan. The fifth set presents estimate of the coping behaviors that Syrian families use as 
strategy to face shocks. With the sixth section assessing the perception of security and 
integration by the head of households. While the last set presents a gauge of the levels of 
happiness and optimism of the household head. 
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Table 1 
Matching Variables 
Name of the variable Description Categories 
Education Level Dummy variable  
High School or College: takes 
value of one (1) 
Below High School or College: 
takes value of zero (0) 
Place of Origin  Dummy variable  
Daraa: takes value of one (1) 
Other places in Syria: take the 
value of zero (0) 
Time Under Reintegration 
Status 
Time variable  
Takes the values of the number 
of years under the main status 
Job Type Dummy variable  
White collar and business: 
takes the value of one (1) 
Blue collar, agriculture, student 
and retired: take the value of 
zero (0) 
Age  Numerical variable  
Takes the values of the ages of 
each head of household 
Gender Dummy variable  
Female: takes the value of one 
(1) 
Male: takes the value of zero (0) 
Family Size Numerical variable  
Takes the number of members 
in the family 
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Table 2 
Dependent Variables 
Income 
Income (USD) Log of income levels in Jordan  
Expenses (USD) Log of expenses levels in Jordan  
Restoration of Expenses to Income 
Ratio  
Takes the value of one (1) if the family has lower 
expenses to income ratio, relative to the one they 
used to have in Syria 
Employment 
Employment Status 
Presence: takes the value of one (1) 
Absence: takes the value of zero (0) 
Satisfaction with Job 
Informal Sector 
Restoration of Employment as the 
Main Source of Income 
Takes the value of one (1) if the family unit has the 
ability to have employment as the main source of 
income  
Wealth 
Same Number of Cars 
Presence: takes the value of one (1).  
Absence: takes the value of zero (0) 
Presence of Savings 
Shocks 
Decrease in Income 
Theft 
Sickness 
Coping 
Strategies 
Child Labor 
Reduction of Food Consumption 
Sell Assets 
Reduction of Educational Expenses 
Security 
Personal Integration 
Starting from one (1) for not at all integrated, to 
ten (10) to completely integrated 
Personal Security 
Bad: takes the value of one (1). Regular: takes the 
value of two (2). Good: takes the value of three (3) 
Psychological 
well-being 
Happiness 
Starting from one (1) for not at all happy, to ten 
(10) for very happy 
Optimism 
Starting from one (1) for not at all optimistic, to 
ten (10) for very optimistic 
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Our main objective in the analysis is to measure the average treatment effect on the treated 
(ATT): 
 
(2) 
ATT=E(Y1|T=1) - E(Y0|T=1) 
 
Where Y1 represents the outcome under treatment status (reintegration), Y0 represents the 
outcomes under non-treatment status (Zaatari Camp), T represents treatment and ATT 
accounts for the Average Treatment Effect of the Treated. The ATT represents the mean 
difference between treatment and non-treatment status for those families that are 
reintegrated. The last term of equation 2 is the counterfactual and represents the average 
outcome for those families that are not reintegrated, had they been integrated. Due to the 
circumstances of our population, it is impossible for us to observe one family been both 
reintegrated and non-reintegrated, what we are able to observe presented in terms of equation 
(3) (Khandker, 2010): 
 
(3) 𝐸 𝑌1 𝑇 = 1 − 𝐸(𝑌0|𝑇 = 0) 
 
Which represents the differences in means of the outcomes under reintegration of the families 
that are reintegrated and the outcomes under non-reintegration for the families that are not 
reintegrated. Therefore, if we add and subtract the counterfactual we can have an equation 
like the following: 
 
(4) 𝐸 𝑌1 𝑇 = 1 − 𝐸 𝑌0 𝑇 = 1 + [𝐸 𝑌0 𝑇 = 1 − 𝐸 𝑌0 𝑇 = 0 ] 
 
In equation 4, we have the ATT on the left-hand side and the selection bias on the right-hand 
side (Khandker, 2010). In our research, one potential source of selection bias is the social 
networks that the Syrian families might have in Jordan before and after the start of the Syrian 
Civil War. This might also be related to the previous socioeconomic conditions of the Syrian 
families, as is the case of some of the families that we interviewed that were able to anticipate 
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an increase of the intensity of the conflict in Syria and prepare for the departure. The literature 
about refugees and our result suggest that that those that were able to anticipate the shock 
tend to have higher levels of education and income (Kunz, 1973).  
 
The matching techniques used in this research solve the problem of not having a randomly 
selected control and treatment groups, assuming that those factors that influenced the 
resettlement process in Jordan are observable and available to be used to match Syrian families 
from both sample groups, allowing us to make a comparative analysis of the outcomes between 
our synthetic control (reintegrated families) and treatment (families living in Zaatari Camp) 
groups. 
 
4. Data Analysis    
 
We present our covariates divided by our two main groups of analysis, treatment (reintegrated 
families) and control group (Zaatari Camp). Our covariates consist of seven variables that 
represent socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of our entire sample when they were 
living in Syria. We have explored the characteristics of both sample groups through probit 
estimations and robustness checks looking for variables that are not affected by the treatment 
and that provide an area of common support between the sample groups.  
 
The variables employed includes: education levels of the head of household, place of origin, 
total time under current status, type of jobs, age and gender of the head of the household, and 
family size. For education levels, we are matching observations that have at minimum a high 
school diploma. In place of origin, we matched Syrian families that used to live in Daraa, since 
most of our population came from that Governorate in Syria. Additionally, we explored the 
possibility of using urban or rural area as matching variables, but our results suggested that 
most of the people from Daraa also used to live in a rural area.   
 
Furthermore, for total time under current migration status, we have constrained our original 
population to only those families that have lived for more than one year under the current 
status compared to the other (either reintegrated or in Zaatari Camp), if they have lived under 
both status in Jordan. For job type we attempted to group based on their average income in 
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Syria. This led to the discovery that due to the characteristic of the labor markets in Syria, 
business owners have the same or higher average income levels than people with white-collar 
jobs.  We also discovered that agriculture and blue-collar jobs have similar levels of income, 
therefore, we decided to match families on whether or not the head of household used to have 
businesses or a white-collar job.  
 
Moreover, for gender, we matched families based on the gender of the head of household 
interviewed. For age, we matched families based on the age of the head of household 
interviewed. And finally, for family size we matched families based on the number of members 
in the family.  
 
We present the summary statistics of our covariates in Table 3 and the summary statistics of 
our outcomes in Table 4, to show that our sample groups are similar and large enough to have 
an area on common support and visualize the main differences in our variables of interest 
between both sample groups.  
 
According to our summary statistics, most of our population did go to high school or achieved 
a higher degree of education. As earlier noted, most of our population comes from the same 
governorate in Syria, Daraa. Also, most Syrian families have lived under their current 
situation for a little more than three years. The majority of the heads of Syrian families in our 
population did not have a job that allow them to have high levels of income. Furthermore, the 
average age of the heads of household is thirty-eight years old. Most of the heads of household 
interviewed were men and the average family has five members. The main differences between 
our sample groups are the levels of education, job types and gender of the person interviewed.  
 
Refugees that are living in non-camp communities have higher levels of education. The 
difference in the type of job in Syria is due to the fact that most of the people in the Zaatari 
Camp comes from Daraa or rural areas, therefore a good number of them used to work as 
farmers. The difference in the gender of the person interview in the sample groups, is due to 
the fact, that during the day the fathers of the non-camp families are out of their homes either 
working or looking for work. Matching estimations were used to control for the heterogeneity 
between both sample groups. 
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The summary statistics of the outcomes provides a first glance of the differences in the 
socioeconomic conditions between both sample groups.  In general, refugees living in non-
camp communities have higher levels of income but also higher levels of expenses. They have 
more labor opportunities but these opportunities come from the informal sector. They are less 
likely to experience a shock but more likely to use negative coping strategies if they experience 
a shock. And finally, they have lower levels of happiness and optimism and perceived 
themselves as less secured or integrated compared to Zaatari refugees.  
  
4.1 Covariate Matching 
 
In this section, we estimate the Average Treatment Effect through the covariate matching 
estimator. Figure 1 presents a summary of our main findings.  
 
Net Income 
 
Our estimations suggest that with reintegration there is an increase in the levels of income by 
69%, however there is also an increase in the levels of expenses by 86%. Furthermore, with 
reintegration there is an increase in the likelihood of having a lower percentage of expenses 
to income than the one they used to have in Syria by 10%. This means that even though 
expenses such as rent are higher in the Jordanian communities relative to Zaatari Camp, with 
reintegration there were some families that were able to increase the net income in Jordan 
compared to the net income they used to have in Syria (Table 5).  
 
Labor Opportunities 
 
With reintegration, there is an increase in the likelihood of being employed by 13%. There is 
also an increase in the probability of having employment as the main source of income by 30%. 
However, there is an increase in the likelihood of being employed in the informal sector by 
47%. Overall, there is a decrease in the probability of being satisfied with the labor 
opportunities by 18% (Table 6). The lower levels in satisfaction with the labor opportunities 
may be a result of the restrictions to receive a work permit. In fact, many Syrian refugees are 
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driven to look for jobs in the informal sector due to these restrictions. Just from our sample 
60% of the non-camp refugees were working in the informal sector. 
 
Restoration of Wealth 
 
For the restoration of wealth our results suggest that with reintegration there is a general 
decrease in the ability of restoring wealth. We restrained our variables related to the 
restoration of durable assets because in the context of the Zaatari Refugee Camp, much of the 
restoration of the durable assets is accomplished through donations. For instance, 
accommodations, TV’s, stoves, and refrigerators are commonly donated in the Camp. The 
ability to have the same number of cars or more and the ability to have savings are in this 
context more accurate indicators of wealth. The covariate matching estimation suggests that 
with reintegration there is a decrease of 24% in the probability of having the same number of 
cars or more as they had in Syria. In addition, and possibly more concerning, there is a 30% 
decrease in the likelihood of having savings (Table 7).   
 
Shocks 
 
In terms of shocks, we are analyzing the probability of experiencing an income shock or a 
shock that may negatively impact the well-being of the family. Our estimations suggest that 
with reintegration, refugees are less likely to experience a shock of this kind. With 
reintegration, non-camp refugees are 13% less likely to experience an income shock. 
Furthermore, there is a decrease of 16% in the likelihood of experiencing theft, with evidence 
estimating 11% decrease in the probability of falling sick in the last month (Table 8).  
 
Coping Strategies  
 
Our results suggest that even though non-camp refugees are in general less likely to 
experience shocks, those families that did experience a shock within reintegration were more 
likely to reduce their levels of consumption that are key for the development of the family, as 
a strategy to cope with the sudden shock. In fact, with reintegration, there is a decrease of 7% 
in the probability of reducing the educational expenses. However, non-camp refugees are 23% 
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more likely to reduce the levels of food consumption in the family if they experience a shock 
(Table 9). Within Zaatari Camp, refugees have access to programs that are strictly designed 
to ensure proper levels of food intake. In other words, Zaatari refugees are less likely to use 
coping mechanism that may affect the levels of food intake.  
 
Perceived security and integration 
 
The covariate estimators of the average treatment effect suggest that with reintegration, there 
is a decrease in the score of perceived integration of the heads of household by 2.7 points. 
However, there is an increase in the score of perceived security of 0.23 points (Table 10). Even 
though Zaatari camp is officially managed by the UNCHR and the Jordanian Government, 
most of the management activities in the camp are carried out by the Syrian community that 
resides there. This implies the existence of a very strong community in which each member is 
able to feel integrated. In non-camp communities, refugees live more spread out and are trying 
to adapt to a host environment as a minority. However, non-camp communities might be at 
least subjectively an environment that offer more alternatives, in the sense that refugees are 
able to move more freely, notwithstanding the restrictions implemented by the Jordanian 
Government. Within the Zaatari Camp, refugees in contrast may experience feelings of 
captivity. The fear of refoulement may be higher in an enclosed environment such as the 
Zaatari Camp. Nevertheless, the decrease in the levels of security is very low, even though our 
results are significant, the actual impact of reintegration of the perceived security might not 
be high enough to be noticed. 
 
Happiness and Optimism 
 
Overall, our estimations suggest that with reintegration there is decrease in the score of 
optimism about the future of 1.1 points and a decrease of 0.4 points for the score of happiness 
of the head of Syrian families (Table 11). This may be a result of the different development 
opportunities that the refugees have in non-camp communities compared to the refugee camp. 
The Zaatari Camp offers protection; however, non-camp communities offer, subjectively, an 
environment in which the refugees have their highest hopes to improve their socioeconomic 
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conditions. The reality in the non-camp communities may be, however, more severe than 
expected.  
 
Stages of adaption 
 
This section proceeds to show estimations based on the four stages of adaptation (Kunz, 1973), 
mentioned in our literature review. However, the characteristics of the population makes it 
impossible for us to analyze the four stages individually. Here, we have combined the first and 
second stage, having a new single first stage for those families that have lived for less than 
four years in Jordan. The new second stage represents the situation in which the families have 
lived for more than four years in Jordan. The literature suggests that the second stage of our 
design is conspicuous by accomplishing the restoration of the living conditions, this 
restoration is in generally not strong enough to match the living conditions that the refugee 
families used to have in their countries of origin, before the increase of the intensity of the 
conflict that led to their forced displacement.  The literature also suggests that in the same 
line, there should be an increase in the levels of resignation, or in other words a decrease in 
the levels of optimism.   
 
Our results (Table 12), suggest that during the second stage, there is no strong evidence that 
reintegration has any effect on the likelihood of being employed, being satisfied with the labor 
opportunities, experiencing an income shock or the probability of reducing educational 
expenses. This suggest that after four years, there is no a significant difference between 
families that live in the Zaatari Camp or the ones that live in Jordanian communities in terms 
of the key preceding parameters. The results also suggest that both the probability of sickness 
and the score of optimism with reintegration decreases in the second stage. 
 
Overall, these results suggest that there is no significant improvement in the development of 
Syrian families being reintegrated, at least not other than the decrease in the probability of 
being sick, with the results also estimating a decrease in the optimism only during the second 
stage. We can conclude that the decrease in optimism might be the result of the protracted 
situation of vulnerability of Syrian families and the very few differences in terms of the sources 
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for labor opportunities between the non-camp communities and the Zaatari Camp after they 
have lived for more than three years in Jordan. 
  
4.2 Propensity score matching  
 
This section presents the Propensity Score Matching estimation as a robustness check using 
the same matching variables and analyzing the same outcomes. Propensity Score Matching 
estimate a score that measures the propensity to be selected into treatment based on a probit 
estimation. The propensity score is then used to match those individuals that have similar 
propensity to be selected into treatment. 
 
Net Income  
 
Our estimations (Table 13), suggest that with reintegration, there is an increase in the levels 
of income by 76%, however there is also an 84% increase in levels of expenses. Furthermore, 
reintegration is associated with 12% increase in the likelihood of having a lower percentage 
of expenses to income to the one they used to have in Syria. 
 
Labor Opportunities 
 
Likewise, reintegration is associated with 20% decrease in the probability of being 
unemployed. More so, there is an increase in the likelihood of having employment as the main 
source of income by 32%. The probability of being employed in the informal sector increases 
by 46% (Table 14). In contrast to what we found with Covariate Matching, the Propensity 
Score Matching estimation presents no strong evidence that reintegration has any effect on 
the likelihood of being satisfied with the labor opportunities.  
 
Restoration of Wealth 
 
For the restoration of wealth, our results suggest that reintegration is correlated with a 
general decrease in the ability of restoring wealth (Table 15). There is decrease of 25% in the 
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probability of having the same number of cars or a higher more number of cars as they had in 
Syria, as well as a 38% decrease in the likelihood of being able to have savings again.   
 
Shocks 
 
Our estimations suggest that there is a general decrease in the likelihood of having a shock 
with reintegration, as evidenced in the probability of experiencing a decline in income and 
theft decreasing by 10% and 15% respectively. More so, the probability being sick in the last 
month decreases by 13% (Table 16).  
 
Coping Behaviors 
 
Our results (Table 17), suggest that the likelihood of reducing educational expenses is a 
decrease by 7%. Contrarily, the probability of reducing food consumption in the family unit 
increases by 24%.  
 
Perceived Security and Integration 
 
The covariate estimators of the average treatment effect suggest that with reintegration, there 
is a decrease in the score of perceived integration for the heads of household of 3 points. 
However, there is an increase in the score of perceived security of 0.16 points (Table 18).  
 
Happiness and Optimism 
 
Overall, our estimations (Tables 19) suggest that with reintegration, there is a 0.874-point 
decrease in the score of optimism about the future for the head of Syrian families. Even though 
our results are significant, the actual impact on the levels of optimism with reintegration are 
less than the 10% of the total, meaning that actual effect is very low. In general, the results 
obtained through the Propensity Score Matching estimation are consistent with that of the 
Covariate Matching estimation.  
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4.3 Rosenbaum Bound Test 
 
After running the PSM estimation, we use the estimation of the Rosenbaum Bound Test to 
measure the presence of endogeneity we would need to have in order to make our matching 
estimations invalid. This test addresses the problem of self-selection based on unobservable 
variables that would potentially affect the impact of the treatment and make the results 
statistically insignificant. The RBT (Rosenbaum Bound Test) suggested that in general, the 
unobserved endogeneity would need to make the Syrian families at least one-hundred percent 
more likely to be reintegrated for the estimations of the PSM to become invalid at a 99% 
significance level (Tables 20-36).  
 
We found that for the likelihoods of experiencing an income shock (Table 29), or sickness 
(Table 31), and for the score of perceived personal security (Table 35), the unobserved 
endogeneity would have to have an effect strong enough to select into reintegration increase 
by less than one-hundred percent and thereby discard the significant results obtained in the 
PSM. Even though these results are not entirely problematic, they suggest that there is a 
higher presence of unobserved explanatory variables for these outcomes.  
 
The probability of experiencing an income shock may be influenced by several factors that 
may also influence the selection into the treatment and its potential outcomes. In this sense, 
to prevent the presence of endogeneity requires the use of different variables for the various 
kinds of income shocks. In other words, a decrease in income may be caused by factors related 
to the particular characteristics of the individual or the family unit, therefore it would be 
preferable to include different sources of income shocks in the model.  
 
Similarly, the likelihood of being sick may be related to certain characteristics of the family 
members, that may not be well captured by the matching variables used in our model. 
Furthermore, the perceived personal security may be also influenced by certain characteristics 
of the families, those that were more affected by the war or facing a very vulnerable situation 
such as elderly people or people with disabilities may seek to live in the camp to ensure their 
own protection. Their own characteristics may influence the decision of where they will 
attempt to live and may cause a persistent feeling of insecurity as well.  
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5. Probit Estimation 
 
This section presents the last robustness check of this paper. We employed a probit estimation 
using the same matching variables as independent variables to measure their effect on our 
main outcomes of interest. In general, result of the probit estimation is consistent with those 
of the CVM and PSM in terms of the effects of reintegration. However, the probit estimation 
also provides some interesting findings, regardless of the place where the Syrian families 
reside in Jordan.  
 
The probit estimation (Table 39), suggest an inverse relationship between the duration of 
residence in Jordan and the probability of job satisfaction, whereby an increase in the former 
is associated with a decrease in the probability of the latter. The results also suggest that 
women are less likely to be employed. Additionally, more years of education decreases the 
likelihood of restoring previous levels of wealth, an indication of a threshold in the extent to 
which refugees are able to restore their previous socioeconomic conditions, especially for those 
with higher previous levels of wealth or education.  
 
Finally, both age of the head of the household and family size increase the probability of child 
labor. This may be because older parents with larger families may have more older children. 
For these kind of families, it is certainly easier to request one of the oldest children to 
contribute to the support of the family. 
 
6. Summary and Conclusion  
 
Are non-camp refugees less vulnerable than Zaatari Camp refugees? The Results from our 
matching techniques suggest that the Zaatari Camp is more suitable for the most vulnerable 
families. Moreover, the situation in the Zaatari Camp is to some extent more stable, since the 
management of the camp is also a responsibility of the UNCHR and the NGOs that work 
there. Within non-camp communities, refugees must face the challenges that come from the 
host government and community, as well as the humanitarian assistance and the aggravation 
of refugee crisis as the intensity of the war increases.  In terms of our variables of interest, the 
following inferences are drawn:  
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1. There are more labor opportunities for refugees in non-camp communities. However, 
the work permit restrictions imposed on the refugees by the Jordanian government 
limits most of them to labor activities in the informal sector. However, we do not find 
evidence of significant difference in their satisfaction with labor opportunities after 
three years living in Jordan. 
2. The levels of both income and expenses are higher in non-camp communities, with 
rent identified as one of the most significant burdens. The UNHCR provides housing 
within the Zaatari Camp, with the quality of accommodation being mainly 
rudimentary. Furthermore, only refugees in non-camp communities are able to 
maintain the same levels of net income comparable to their previous levels of earnings 
in Syria.  
3. It is harder for refugees to restore their previous levels of wealth in non-camp 
communities. However, there is a threshold for the level of restoration of the previous 
levels of wealth, and in that sense, those who used to have better socioeconomic 
conditions are on average less likely to restore these levels, regardless of their place of 
abode in Jordan.  
4. Refuges living in non-camp communities are less likely to experience any kind of 
shock. However, after years of living under the same status, refugees that live in non-
camp communities are less likely to suffer from ailments. 
5. Under a family shock, refugees who resides in non-camp communities are more likely 
to reduce the levels of food consumption as a coping mechanism.  
6. Those refugees that live in non-camp communities perceived themselves to be less 
integrated in the non-camp communities but more secured. The strong Syrian 
community in Zaatari Camp and the fear of refoulement play a key role in this matter. 
7. Levels of optimism are higher in the refugees that are living in Zaatari Camp. 
However, this do not mean that the situation in Zaatari is actually better. The truth is 
that refugees put very high hopes on the potential opportunities that the non-camp 
communities can provide, their lower levels of optimism are influenced by a very 
strong feeling of resignation, which are intensified in non-camp communities after the 
third year living under that status.  
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Six years have passed since the breakout of the Syrian Civil War. In the context of the 
Syrian Refugee Crisis in Jordan, much of the resources that were available to support the 
Syrian refugees have already been depleted. An environment such as the Zaatari Camp 
still offers a safe space for the most vulnerable families. However, real opportunities for 
reintegration of the Syrian families outside the refugee camps are highly limited. Those 
laws that were in a first place to protect Syrian families are now being restricted, making 
them in some instances obsoletes. Overtime, the level of support that the Jordanian 
Government is able to provide to the Syrian refugee community is on a consistent decline. 
The fewer levels of international aid and the discontent of the Jordanian society are 
increasing the pressure of a country that has already faced refugee crisis for almost seventy 
years.  
 
To mobilize resources and implement policies aimed at restoring and improving the 
previous socioeconomic conditions of the refugees, one of the first steps would be to entail 
providing work permits to Syrian refugees, thus enabling them cope effectively with the 
prevailing economic environment. Access to public services and the possibility of being 
formally integrated through citizenship are further steps that would benefit the Syrian 
Refugee community. In this sense, policies that can integrate the development of both the 
host and refugee community are imperative. In other words, international humanitarian 
aid and the resources from the Jordanian Government should be effectively harnessed to 
ensure sustainable development of both communities. Currently, only a meager 8% of the 
required funding have been collected to cover the needs of those refugees that were 
registered in Jordan. Thus, the magnitude of the resource deficit cannot be under-
emphasized, with concerted global collaboration and efforts now required to solve the 
Syrian Refugee Crisis in Jordan. 
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Appendix 
 
Table 3: Summary Statistics of the Matching Variables 
Means and p-values 
Variables Zaatari Camp Reintegration p-value 
High School or Higher 0.179 0.398 0.000 
Daraa 0.831 0.656 0.000 
Years Under Main Status 3.435 3.374 0.463 
Good Quality of Jobs 0.271 0.547 0.000 
Age 38.344 39.672 0.363 
Female 0.206 0.633 0.000 
Family size 5.050 4.969 0.759 
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Table 4: Summary Statistics of the Outcomes 
Means and p-values 
Variables Zaatari Camp Reintegration p-value 
Income in Jordan (USD) 206.794 375.911 0.000 
Expenses in Jordan (USD) 137.807 278.953 0.000 
Restoration of Expenses to Income Ratio 0.005 0.141 0.000 
Employment Status 0.303 0.359 0.278 
Informal Sector 0.165 0.606 0.000 
Restoration of Employment as the Main Source of Income 0.289 0.547 0.000 
Satisfaction with Job 0.576 0.409 0.005 
Same Number of Cars 0.688 0.508 0.001 
Presence of Savings  0.853 0.508 0.000 
Decrease in Income 0.922 0.787 0.000 
Theft 0.225 0.032 0.000 
Sickness 0.211 0.173 0.396 
Sell Assets 0.335 0.331 0.937 
Child Labor 0.229 0.276 0.334 
Reduction in Educational Expenses 0.206 0.139 0.125 
Reduction in Food Consumption 0.569 0.72 0.005 
Personal Integration 7.986 4.756 0.000 
Personal Security 2.636 2.798 0.020 
Happiness 5.05 4.524 0.082 
Optimism 6.128 5.11 0.002 
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Figure 1. Impact Estimates from Reintegration based on Covariate Matching 
Estimations  
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Table 5: Net Income 
Covariate Matching Estimations 
 VARIABLES Log of Income in Jordan 
Log of Expenses 
in Jordan 
Probability of Having a Lower Expenses 
to Income Ratio 
Reintegration 0.687*** 0.861*** 0.104*** 
 (0.125) (0.138) (0.0251) 
Observations 325 318 335 
Standard error in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 6: Labor Opportunities 
Covariate Matching Estimations 
VARIABLES Probability of being Employed 
Probability of 
Having a Job in 
the Informal 
Sector 
Probability of Having 
Employment as the 
Main Source of 
Income 
Probability of 
Being Satisfied 
with the 
Current Job 
Reintegration 0.13 0.467*** 0.297*** -0.183* 
 (0.0836) (0.0828) (0.0932) (0.0956) 
Observations 335 334 335 304 
Standard error in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 7: Wealth 
Covariate Matching Estimations 
VARIABLES Probability of Having the Same Number of Cars or More 
Probability of Restoring the ability to have 
Savings 
Reintegration -0.237*** -0.304*** 
  (0.0893) (0.0599) 
Observations 335 335 
Standard error in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 8: Shocks 
Covariate Matching Estimations 
Standard error in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 9: Coping Strategies 
Covariate Matching Estimations 
VARIABLES Probability of Selling Assets 
Probability of 
Child Labor 
Probability of 
Reducing Educational 
Expenses 
Probability of 
Reducing Food 
Consumption 
Reintegration 0.0589 0.00606 -0.0790** 0.230*** 
  (0.0902) (0.0534) (0.0387) (0.0623) 
Observations 331 330 329 332 
Standard error in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 10: Security and Integration 
Covariate Matching Estimations 
VARIABLES Perceived Integration Score (1-5) 
Perceived Personal Security 
Score (1-5) 
Reintegration -2.724*** 0.235*** 
  (0.500) (0.0607) 
Observations 330 328 
Standard error in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VARIABLES Probability of Experiencing an Income Shock 
Probability of 
Experiencing Theft 
Probability of 
Experiencing Sickness 
Reintegration -0.132*** -0.162*** -0.105** 
  (0.0476) (0.0515) (0.048) 
Observations 334 333 334 
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Table 11: Psychological Well-Being 
Covariate Matching Estimations 
Standard error in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 12: First and Second Stage of Adaptation 
Covariate Matching Estimation 
Variables 
Probability 
of Being 
Employed 
Probability of 
Being 
Satisfied with 
Current Job 
Probability of 
Experiencing 
an Income 
Shock 
Probability of 
Experiencing 
Sickness 
Probability of 
Reducing 
Educational 
Expenses 
Optimism 
Score (1-10)  
Stage 1 
(1-3 years) 0.172* -0.339*** -0.157** 0 -0.106* -0.908 
 (0.095) (0.0822) (0.0693) (0.0651) (0.0616) (0.784) 
Observations 186 171 185 185 180 185 
Stage 2 
(3-6 years) 0.11 -0.097 -0.0667 -0.213*** -0.0533 -1.173* 
 (0.127) (0.141) (0.066) (0.0709) (0.0649) (0.673) 
Observations 150 134 150 150 150 150 
Standard error in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VARIABLES Happiness Score (1-10) 
Optimism 
Score (1-10) 
Reintegration -0.404 -1.114** 
  (0.482) (0.486) 
Observations 333 334 
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Table 13: Net Income 
Propensity Score Matching Estimation 
Standard error in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 14: Labor opportunities 
Propensity Score Matching Estimation 
VARIABLES 
Probability 
of Being 
Employed 
Probability of 
Having a Job 
in the Informal 
Sector 
Probability of Having 
Employment as the 
Main Source of 
Income 
Probability of Being 
Satisfied with 
Current Job 
Reintegration 0.190*** 0.455*** 0.318*** -0.158 
  (0.0698) (0.0643) (0.0956) (0.0967) 
Observations 335 334 335 304 
Standard error in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 15: Wealth 
Propensity Score Matching Estimation 
VARIABLES Probability of Having the Same Number of Cars or More 
Probability of Restoring the 
ability to have Savings 
      
Reintegration -0.252*** -0.381*** 
  (0.0733) (0.0605) 
      
Observations 335 335 
Standard error in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
VARIABLES Log of Income in Jordan 
Log of Expenses in 
Jordan 
Probability of Having a 
Lower Expenses to Income 
Ratio 
Reintegration 0.755*** 0.843*** 0.116*** 
  (0.149) (0.14) (0.0408) 
Observations 325 318 335 
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Table 16: Shocks 
Propensity Score Matching Estimation 
Standard error in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 17: Coping Strategies 
Propensity Score Matching Estimation 
VARIABLES 
Probability 
of Selling 
Assets 
Probability 
of Child 
Labor 
Probability of 
Reducing Educational 
Expenses 
Probability of 
Reducing Food 
Consumption 
          
Reintegration -0.035 -0.027 -0.0694* 0.248*** 
  (0.0963) (0.0451) (0.0362) (0.0648) 
          
Observations 331 330 329 332 
Standard error in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 18: Integration and Security 
Propensity Score Matching Estimation 
VARIABLES Perceived Integration Score (1-5) Perceived Personal Security Score (1-5) 
      
Reintegration -3.088*** 0.159*** 
  (0.496) (0.0601) 
      
Observations 330 328 
Standard error in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
VARIABLES 
Probability of 
Experiencing an Income 
Shock 
Probability of 
Experiencing 
Theft 
Probability of 
Experiencing 
Sickness 
        
Reintegration -0.100* -0.152*** -0.126** 
  (0.0553) (0.0334) (0.0544) 
        
Observations 334 333 334 
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Table 19: Psychological Well-being 
Propensity Score Matching Estimation 
VARIABLES Happiness Score (1-10) Optimism Score (1-10) 
      
Reintegration -0.520 -0.874* 
  (0.367) (0.522) 
      
Observations 333 334 
Standard error in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 20: Log Income in Jordan 
Rosenbaum Bound Test 
Gamma sig+ sig- t-hat+ t-hat- CI+ CI- 
1 0.00000 0.00000 0.68500 0.68500 0.45300 0.92900 
2 0.00000 0.00000 0.38700 0.99700 0.12600 1.27300 
3 0.02100 0.00000 0.21700 1.17500 -0.07600 1.50400 
3.65 0.09500 0.00000 0.14100 1.25700 -0.18400 1.60900 
3.7 0.10400 0.00000 0.13600 1.26300 -0.19100 1.61600 
* gamma  - log odds of differential assignment due to unobserved factors 
sig+   - upper bound significance level 
sig-   - lower bound significance level 
t-hat+ - upper bound Hodges-Lehmann point estimate 
t-hat- - lower bound Hodges-Lehmann point estimate 
CI+    - upper bound confidence interval (a=  .99)   
CI-      - lower bound confidence interval (a=  .99) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 45 
Table 21: Log Expenses in Jordan 
Rosenbaum Bound Test 
Gamma sig+ sig- t-hat+ t-hat- CI+ CI- 
1 0.00000 0.00000 0.74500 0.74500 0.42900 1.05100 
2 0.01400 0.00000 0.33400 1.12900 -0.07500 1.46400 
2.45 0.08800 0.00000 0.21300 1.24100 -0.24600 1.59300 
2.5 0.10200 0.00000 0.19900 1.25500 -0.26000 1.60400 
* gamma  - log odds of differential assignment due to unobserved factors 
sig+   - upper bound significance level 
sig-   - lower bound significance level 
t-hat+ - upper bound Hodges-Lehmann point estimate 
t-hat- - lower bound Hodges-Lehmann point estimate 
CI+    - upper bound confidence interval (a=  .99)   
CI-      - lower bound confidence interval (a=  .99) 
 
Table 22: Probability of Having a Lower Expenses to Income Ratio 
Rosenbaum Bound Test 
Gamma Q_mh+ Q_mh- p_mh+ p_mh- 
1 1.80100 1.80100 0.03600 0.03600 
1.05 1.75500 1.86100 0.04000 0.03100 
1.6 1.33700 2.36800 0.09100 0.00900 
1.65 1.308 2.408 0.095 0.008 
1.7 1.28100 2.44800 0.10000 0.00700 
Gamma : odds of differential assignment due to unobserved factors 
Q_mh+ : Mantel-Haenszel statistic (assumption: overestimation of treatment effect) 
Q_mh- : Mantel-Haenszel statistic (assumption: underestimation of treatment effect) 
p_mh+ : significance level (assumption: overestimation of treatment effect) 
p_mh- : significance level (assumption: underestimation of treatment effect) 
 
 
Table 23: Probability of being Employed 
Rosenbaum Bound Test 
Gamma Q_mh+ Q_mh- p_mh+ p_mh- 
1 1.37262 1.37262 0.084934 0.084934 
1.05 1.24441 1.51229 0.106675 0.06523 
Gamma : odds of differential assignment due to unobserved factors 
Q_mh+ : Mantel-Haenszel statistic (assumption: overestimation of treatment effect) 
Q_mh- : Mantel-Haenszel statistic (assumption: underestimation of treatment effect) 
p_mh+ : significance level (assumption: overestimation of treatment effect) 
p_mh- : significance level (assumption: underestimation of treatment effect) 
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Table 24: Probability of Having Employment as the Main Source of Income  
Rosenbaum Bound Test 
Gamma Q_mh+ Q_mh- p_mh+ p_mh- 
1 2.42548 2.42548 0.007644 0.007644 
1.1 2.17183 2.70035 0.014934 0.003463 
1.2 1.9323 2.94357 0.026662 0.001622 
1.3 1.71275 3.16854 0.043379 0.000766 
1.4 1.5101 3.37795 0.065509 0.000365 
1.5 1.3219 3.57396 0.0931 0.000176 
1.55 1.2326 3.66748 0.108862 0.000122 
Gamma : odds of differential assignment due to unobserved factors 
Q_mh+ : Mantel-Haenszel statistic (assumption: overestimation of treatment effect) 
Q_mh- : Mantel-Haenszel statistic (assumption: underestimation of treatment effect) 
p_mh+ : significance level (assumption: overestimation of treatment effect) 
p_mh- : significance level (assumption: underestimation of treatment effect) 
 
Table 25: Probability of Being Satisfied with Current Job 
Rosenbaum Bound Test 
Gamma Q_mh+ Q_mh- p_mh+ p_mh- 
1 1.76172 1.76172 0.039058 0.039058 
1.1 2.02505 1.51483 0.021431 0.064908 
1.2 2.25942 1.28316 0.011929 0.099717 
1.25 2.36974 1.17469 0.0089 0.120059 
Gamma : odds of differential assignment due to unobserved factors 
Q_mh+ : Mantel-Haenszel statistic (assumption: overestimation of treatment effect) 
Q_mh- : Mantel-Haenszel statistic (assumption: underestimation of treatment effect) 
p_mh+ : significance level (assumption: overestimation of treatment effect) 
p_mh- : significance level (assumption: underestimation of treatment effect) 
 
Table 26: Probability of Having a Job in the Informal Sector 
Rosenbaum Bound Test 
Gamma Q_mh+ Q_mh- p_mh+ p_mh- 
1 4.27399 4.27399 0.00001 0.00001 
2 2.43826 6.28604 0.00738 0.00000 
3 1.39696 7.54559 0.08121 0.00000 
3.1 1.31365 7.65105 0.09448 0.00000 
3.15 1.27304 7.70273 0.10150 0.00000 
Gamma : odds of differential assignment due to unobserved factors 
Q_mh+ : Mantel-Haenszel statistic (assumption: overestimation of treatment effect) 
Q_mh- : Mantel-Haenszel statistic (assumption: underestimation of treatment effect) 
p_mh+ : significance level (assumption: overestimation of treatment effect) 
p_mh- : significance level (assumption: underestimation of treatment effect) 
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Table 27: Probability of Having the Same Number of Cars or More 
Rosenbaum Bound Test 
Gamma Q_mh+ Q_mh- p_mh+ p_mh- 
1 1.77754 1.77754 0.03774 0.03774 
1.1 2.04206 1.52873 0.020573 0.063166 
1.2 2.2781 1.29584 0.01136 0.097515 
1.25 2.38926 1.18683 0.008441 0.117646 
Gamma : odds of differential assignment due to unobserved factors 
Q_mh+ : Mantel-Haenszel statistic (assumption: overestimation of treatment effect) 
Q_mh- : Mantel-Haenszel statistic (assumption: underestimation of treatment effect) 
p_mh+ : significance level (assumption: overestimation of treatment effect) 
p_mh- : significance level (assumption: underestimation of treatment effect) 
 
Table 28: Probability of Restoring the Ability of Having Savings 
Rosenbaum Bound Test 
Gamma Q_mh+ Q_mh- p_mh+ p_mh- 
1 4.02139 4.02139 0.00003 0.00003 
2 5.9106 2.34182 0.00000 0.00960 
3 7.12498 1.40399 0.00000 0.08016 
3.1 7.22805 1.32939 0.00000 0.09186 
3.2 7.32863 1.2573 0.00000 0.10432 
Gamma : odds of differential assignment due to unobserved factors 
Q_mh+ : Mantel-Haenszel statistic (assumption: overestimation of treatment effect) 
Q_mh- : Mantel-Haenszel statistic (assumption: underestimation of treatment effect) 
p_mh+ : significance level (assumption: overestimation of treatment effect) 
p_mh- : significance level (assumption: underestimation of treatment effect) 
 
Table 29: Probability of Experiencing an Income Shock 
Rosenbaum Bound Test 
Gamma Q_mh+ Q_mh- p_mh+ p_mh- 
     
1 1.25272 1.25272 0.105153 0.105153 
1.05 1.36328 1.15251 0.086397 0.124556 
Gamma : odds of differential assignment due to unobserved factors 
Q_mh+ : Mantel-Haenszel statistic (assumption: overestimation of treatment effect) 
Q_mh- : Mantel-Haenszel statistic (assumption: underestimation of treatment effect) 
p_mh+ : significance level (assumption: overestimation of treatment effect) 
p_mh- : significance level (assumption: underestimation of treatment effect) 
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Table 30: Probability of Experiencing Theft 
Rosenbaum Bound Test 
Gamma Q_mh+ Q_mh- p_mh+ p_mh- 
1 2.73882 2.73882 0.00308 0.00308 
2 4.2283 1.4901 0.00001 0.06810 
2.1 4.34394 1.40705 0.00001 0.07971 
2.2 4.4559 1.3284 0.00000 0.09202 
2.3 4.5645 1.25371 0.00000 0.10497 
Gamma : odds of differential assignment due to unobserved factors 
Q_mh+ : Mantel-Haenszel statistic (assumption: overestimation of treatment effect) 
Q_mh- : Mantel-Haenszel statistic (assumption: underestimation of treatment effect) 
p_mh+ : significance level (assumption: overestimation of treatment effect) 
p_mh- : significance level (assumption: underestimation of treatment effect) 
 
Table 31: Probability of Experiencing Sickness 
Rosenbaum Bound Test 
Gamma Q_mh+ Q_mh- p_mh+ p_mh- 
1 0.35386 0.35386 0.361722 0.361722 
1.05 0.46305 0.247588 0.321664 0.402227 
Gamma : odds of differential assignment due to unobserved factors 
Q_mh+ : Mantel-Haenszel statistic (assumption: overestimation of treatment effect) 
Q_mh- : Mantel-Haenszel statistic (assumption: underestimation of treatment effect) 
p_mh+ : significance level (assumption: overestimation of treatment effect) 
p_mh- : significance level (assumption: underestimation of treatment effect) 
 
Table 32: Probability of Reducing Educational Expenses 
Rosenbaum Bound Test 
Gamma Q_mh+ Q_mh- p_mh+ p_mh- 
1 0.917355 0.917355 0.179478 0.179478 
1.05 1.01866 0.824075 0.154183 0.204949 
Gamma : odds of differential assignment due to unobserved factors 
Q_mh+ : Mantel-Haenszel statistic (assumption: overestimation of treatment effect) 
Q_mh- : Mantel-Haenszel statistic (assumption: underestimation of treatment effect) 
p_mh+ : significance level (assumption: overestimation of treatment effect) 
p_mh- : significance level (assumption: underestimation of treatment effect) 
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Table 33: Probability of Reducing Food Consumption 
Rosenbaum Bound Test 
Gamma Q_mh+ Q_mh- p_mh+ p_mh- 
1 2.00981 2.00981 0.022226 0.022226 
1.1 1.76565 2.27173 0.038727 0.011551 
1.2 1.53644 2.50486 0.062215 0.006125 
1.3 1.32642 2.72066 0.092351 0.003258 
1.35 1.22763 2.82289 0.109792 0.00238 
Gamma : odds of differential assignment due to unobserved factors 
Q_mh+ : Mantel-Haenszel statistic (assumption: overestimation of treatment effect) 
Q_mh- : Mantel-Haenszel statistic (assumption: underestimation of treatment effect) 
p_mh+ : significance level (assumption: overestimation of treatment effect) 
p_mh- : significance level (assumption: underestimation of treatment effect) 
 
Table 34: Perceived Integration - Score (1-5) 
Rosenbaum Bound Test 
Gamma sig+ sig- t-hat+ t-hat- CI+ CI- 
1 0.00000 0.00000 -3.00000 -3.00000 -4.00000 -2.00000 
2 0.00000 0.00001 -4.50000 -2.00000 -5.50000 -1.00000 
3 0.00000 0.00253 -5.00000 -1.00000 -6.00000 0.00000 
4 0.00000 0.03165 -5.50000 -1.00000 -6.50000 0.50000 
4.1 0.00000 0.03770 -5.50000 -1.00000 -6.50000 0.50000 
4.2 0.00000 0.04446 -5.50000 -0.50000 -6.50000 0.50000 
4.3 0.00000 0.05195 -5.50000 -0.50000 -6.50000 0.50000 
4.4 0.00000 0.06018 -5.50000 -0.50000 -6.50000 0.50000 
4.5 0.00000 0.06914 -5.50000 -0.50000 -7.00000 0.50000 
4.6 0.00000 0.07885 -5.50000 -0.50000 -7.00000 1.00000 
4.7 0.00000 0.08929 -5.50000 -0.50000 -7.00000 1.00000 
4.8 0.00000 0.10045 -5.50000 -0.50000 -7.00000 1.00000 
* gamma  - log odds of differential assignment due to unobserved factors 
sig+   - upper bound significance level 
sig-   - lower bound significance level 
t-hat+ - upper bound Hodges-Lehmann point estimate 
t-hat- - lower bound Hodges-Lehmann point estimate 
CI+    - upper bound confidence interval (a=  .99)   
CI-      - lower bound confidence interval (a=  .99) 
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Table 35: Perceived Personal Security – Score (1-5) 
 Rosenbaum Bound Test 
Gamma sig+ sig- t-hat+ t-hat- CI+ CI- 
1 0.28217 0.28217 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
1.05 0.32635 0.24098 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
* gamma  - log odds of differential assignment due to unobserved factors 
sig+   - upper bound significance level 
sig-   - lower bound significance level 
t-hat+ - upper bound Hodges-Lehmann point estimate 
t-hat- - lower bound Hodges-Lehmann point estimate 
CI+    - upper bound confidence interval (a=  .99)   
CI-      - lower bound confidence interval (a=  .99) 
 
Table 36: Optimism – Score (1-10) 
Rosenbaum Bound Test 
Gamma sig+ sig- t-hat+ t-hat- CI+ CI- 
1 0.00000 0.00000 -2.50000 -2.50000 -3.50000 -1.50000 
2 0.00000 0.00324 -3.50000 -1.00000 -4.50000 0.00000 
2.1 0.00000 0.00586 -3.50000 -1.00000 -5.00000 0.00000 
2.2 0.00000 0.00990 -3.50000 -1.00000 -5.00000 0.00000 
2.3 0.00000 0.01582 -4.00000 -1.00000 -5.00000 0.50000 
2.4 0.00000 0.02404 -4.00000 -1.00000 -5.00000 0.50000 
2.5 0.00000 0.03498 -4.00000 -1.00000 -5.00000 0.50000 
2.6 0.00000 0.04898 -4.00000 -1.00000 -5.00000 0.50000 
2.7 0.00000 0.06628 -4.00000 -0.50000 -5.50000 0.50000 
2.8 0.00000 0.08702 -4.00000 -0.50000 -5.50000 0.50000 
2.9 0.00000 0.11122 -4.00000 -0.50000 -5.50000 1.00000 
* gamma  - log odds of differential assignment due to unobserved factors 
sig+   - upper bound significance level 
sig-   - lower bound significance level 
t-hat+ - upper bound Hodges-Lehmann point estimate 
t-hat- - lower bound Hodges-Lehmann point estimate 
CI+    - upper bound confidence interval (a=  .99)   
CI-      - lower bound confidence interval (a=  .99) 
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Table 37: Net Income and Labor Opportunities 
Probit Estimation 
 
Restore 
Expenses to 
Income 
Ratio 
Employment 
Restore Employment 
as the Main Source 
of Income 
Satisfaction 
with Job 
Job in the 
Informal Sector 
Reintegration 
1.659*** 0.226 0.683*** -0.567*** 1.174*** 
(0.468) (0.176) (0.173) (0.182) (0.179) 
Education 
-0.33 0.469*** 0.127 0.305* -0.113 
(0.312) (0.168) (0.165) (0.175) (0.177) 
Daraa 
0.434 0.0127 0.244 -0.162 -0.0657 
(0.338) (0.18) (0.179) (0.182) (0.184) 
Years Current 
Status 
0.226 -0.0359 -0.0599 -0.286*** 0.00139 
(0.181) (0.102) (0.0997) (0.101) (0.106) 
Job Type 
-0.411 0.238 0.302* -0.109 0.103 
(0.3) (0.158) (0.154) (0.161) (0.165) 
Age 
-0.0119 -0.00725 -0.00884 0.000345 -0.000959 
(0.0117) (0.00602) (0.00578) (0.00596) (0.00609) 
Female 
0.789** -0.622*** -0.185 0.176 0.102 
(0.329) (0.173) (0.167) (0.1730) (0.173) 
Family Size 
-0.00276 0.00484 -0.0372 0.0338 0.00162 
(0.0742) (0.031) (0.031) (0.0311) (0.0331) 
Constant -3.588*** -0.169 -0.0814 1.039** -0.910* (0.922) (0.458) (0.448) (0.458) (0.475) 
Observations 335 335 335 304 334 
Standard error in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 38: Wealth 
Probit Estimation 
 Same number of Cars Restore Savings 
Reintegration -0.429** -0.853*** (0.172) (0.181) 
Education -0.411** -0.555*** (0.164) (0.171) 
Daraa -0.076 0.0284 (0.1740 (0.189) 
Years Current Status 0.114 0.0376 (0.0985) (0.107) 
Job Types -0.205 -0.186 (0.154) (0.165) 
Age 0.00292 -1.00E-04 (0.00577) (0.006420 
Female 0.293* -0.0293 (0.168) (0.177) 
Family Size -0.0192 -0.0276 (0.03010) (0.03440) 
Constant 0.185 1.209** (0.4410) (0.48600) 
Observations 335 335 
Standard error in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 39: Shocks and Coping Strategies 
Probit Estimation 
 Decrease in Income Theft Sickness 
Sell 
Assets 
Child 
Labor 
Reduce 
Education 
Expenses 
Reduce 
Food 
Intake 
Reintegration 
-0.751*** -1.018*** -0.291 0.12 0.0618 -0.233 0.594*** 
(0.215) (0.279) (0.196) (0.175) (0.194) (0.21) (0.177) 
Education 
0.0898 0.246 -0.115 0.0668 -0.113 0.276 -0.176 
(0.211) (0.223) (0.19) (0.168) (0.195) (0.194) (0.168) 
Daraa 
0.0184 0.057 -0.0908 0.0642 -0.208 -0.154 -0.0159 
(0.216) (0.253) (0.196) (0.178) (0.194) (0.206) (0.177) 
Years Current 
Status 
0.0183 0.421*** 0.087 -0.0196 0.0549 0.071 0.0315 
(0.122) (0.151) (0.111) (0.101) (0.11) (0.121) (0.0977) 
Job Types  
-0.215 0.104 0.225 -0.176 0.411** -0.162 -0.254 
(0.194) (0.2) (0.169 (0.158) (0.1720) (0.184) (0.156) 
Age 
-0.00589 -0.00181 0.00265 -0.00524 0.0271*** 0.00661 0.00196 
(0.00697) (0.007730) (0.00639) (0.00586) (0.00654) (0.00668) (0.0056) 
Female 
0.474** -0.492** 0.178 -0.0714 0.00833 -0.113 -0.0405 
(0.217) (0.239) (0.182) (0.168) (0.185) (0.1990) (0.166) 
Family Size 
0.0556 0.0396 0.0149 0.0198 0.0930*** 0.0733** 0.0147 
(0.0414) (0.0371) (0.0333) (0.0303) (0.0333) (0.0343) (0.0295) 
Constant 
1.242** -2.416*** -1.269** -0.311 -2.502*** -1.599*** -0.019 
(0.557) (0.65) (0.496) (0.445) (0.523) (0.525) (0.438) 
        
Observations 334 333 334 331 330 329 332 
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Appendix 40: Survey 
I. Basic Data 
Age 
ﺮﻤﻌﻟا 
  Education 
ﻠﻌﺘﻟا ىﻮﺘﺴﻤﻟاﻲﻤﯿ  
  Nationality 
ﺔﯿﺴﻨﺠﻟا 
  
Gender (F/M) 
ﺲﻨﺠﻟا 
  Civil Status 
ﯿﻋﺎﻤﺘﺟﻻا ﺔﻟﺎﺤﻟاﺔ  
  Family Size 
ةﺮﺳﻷا داﺮﻓأ دﺪﻋ 
  
Asylum seeker (1) 
Refugee document (2) 
  First 
Language 
  City of Birth 
ةدﻻﻮﻟا نﺎﻜﻣ 
  
Place of Residence in Home 
Country? 
ﺎﯾرﻮﺳ ﻲﻓ ﺔﻣﺎﻗﻻا نﺎﻜﻣ 
  Rural/urban? 
ﺔﻨﯾﺪﻣ/ﺔﯾﺮﻗ 
  Religion 
ﺔﻧﺎﯾﺪﻟا 
  
II. Family Unit 
Relationship 
ﮫﻗﻼﻌﻟا 
Age 
ﺮﻤﻌﻟا 
 
Status 
ﺔﻟﺎﺤﻟا 
ﯿﻋﺎﻤﺘﺟﻻاﺔ  
Medical condition 
ﺔﯿﺤﺼﻟا ﺔﻟﺎﺤﻟا 
Length of time in/ 
out of school 
 ﻲﻓ هﺎﻀﻗ يﺬﻟا ﻦﻣﺰﻟا
ﺔﺳرﺪﻤﻟا 
Length of 
time living 
in Jordan 
 ﻲﺘﻟا ةﺪﻤﻟا
 ﻲﻓ ﺎھﺎﻀﻗ
ندرﻻا  
            
            
            
            
            
            
Is there any member of your family still living in Syria? Who is still living in Syria?  
؟ ﻮھ ﻦﻣ؟ ﺎﯾرﻮﺳ ﻲﻓ ﺶﯿﻌﯾ لاز ﺎﻣ ﻚﺗﺮﺳا دﺮﻓا ﻦﻣ دﺮﻓ يا كﺎﻨھ ﻞھ  
    
Has any member of your family gotten married since your arrival to Jordan? 
 ؟ندرﻻا ﻰﻟا ﻢﻜﻟﻮﺻو ﺬﻨﻣ ﻚﺗﺮﺳا داﺮﻓا ﺪﺣا جوﺰﺗ ﻞھ 
  
III. Residence 
Have you and your family lived in a different place in Jordan since your arrival?  
؟ندرﻻا ﻰﻟا ﻢﻜﻟﻮﺻو ﺬﻨﻣ ﺮﺜﻛا ﻲﻓ ﻚﺗﺮﺳا داﺮﻓاو ﺖﻧا ﺖﺸﻋ ﻞھ 
  
Place of residence.  
ﺔﻣﺎﻗﻻا نﺎﻜﻣ 
Length of time living in that place.  
ﺔﻣﺎﻗﻻا ةﺪﻣ 
  
  
    
    
    
If you used to live in one of the refugee camps, to what do you attribute the fact that you or your family were able to leave 
the camp?  
ﻒﯿﻛ ﺢﺿو. ﻦﯿﯿﺌﺟﻼﻟا تﺎﻤﯿﺨﻣ ﻦﻣ يا ﻲﻓ ﺖﺸﻋ ﺖﻨﻛ اذا ؟ ﻢﯿﺨﻤﻟا ﻦﻣ ﻢﺘﺟﺮﺧ 
  
IV. Wealth (Durable assets) 
  Country of 
origin 
Jordan Donated, Inherited, 
Rented or Owned 
Characteristics 
Houses 
تﻮﯿﺑ 
        
Rooms  
فﺮﻏ 
        
Restrooms 
تﺎﻣﺎﻤﺣ 
        
Televisions         
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نﻮﯾﺰﻔﻠﺗ 
Refrigerators 
ﺔﺟﻼﺛ 
        
Stoves 
ناﺮﻓا 
        
Cars 
تارﺎﯿﺳ 
        
Vacations a year 
ﺔﻨﺴﻟا ﺔﯾﺎﮭﻧ تازﺎﺟا 
        
Times a week when you go 
out with your family 
ﺎﯿﻋﻮﺒﺳا ﺔﻠﺋﺎﻌﻟا ﻊﻣ جوﺮﺨﻟا تاﺮﻣ دﺪﻋ 
        
Access to loans 
ضﺮﻗ ﻰﻠﻋ لﻮﺼﺤﻟا 
        
Access to retirement plan/ 
Pension 
يﺪﻋﺎﻘﺗ ﺐﺗار ﻰﻠﻋ لﻮﺼﺤﻟا 
        
Savings 
رﺎﺧدﻻا 
        
Debts 
ﻦﯾﺪﻟا 
        
V. Economic Data 
Describe the main activities that make up the average day:  
؟ﺎﯿﻣﻮﯾ ﺎﮭﺑ مﻮﻘﺗ ﻲﺘﻟا تﺎطﺎﺸﻨﻟا ﻢھا ﻲھ ﺎﻣ 
  
Are you currently employed, unemployed or looking for a job?  
؟ ﻞﻤﻋ ﻦﻋ ﺚﺤﺒﺗ,ﻒظﻮﻣ ﺮﯿﻏ,ﻒظﻮﻣ ﺎﯿﻟﺎﺣ ﺖﻧا ﻞھ 
  
Which members of your family were employed in your country of origin?  
؟ﺎﯾرﻮﺳ ﻲﻓ ﻞﻤﻌﯾ نﺎﻛ ﻚﺗﺮﺳا داﺮﻓا ﻦﻣ يا 
  
Which members of the family are currently employed?  
؟ﺎﯿﻟﺎﺣ ﻞﻤﻌﯾ ﻚﺗﺮﺳا داﺮﻓا ﻦﻣ يا 
  
What was your main occupation in your home country?  
؟ﺎﯾرﻮﺳ ﻲﻓ ﻚﻟ ﻲﺴﯿﺋﺮﻟا ﻞﺧﺪﻟا رﺪﺼﻣ نﺎﻛ اذﺎﻣ 
  
What have been your last three jobs here?  
ﺖﻠﻤﻋ ﻒﺋﺎظو ثﻼﺛ ﺮﺧا ﻲھ ﺎﻣ ؟ندرﻻا ﻲﻓ ﺎﻨھ ﺎﮭﯿﻓ 
    
Main sources of income 
Syria Amount Jordan Amount 
        
        
        
Expenses Syria Jordan 
Rent. رﺎﺟﻻا     
Food. مﺎﻌﻄﻟا     
Health. ﺔﺤﺼﻟا      
Education. ﻢﯿﻠﻌﺘﻟا     
Electricity. ءﺎﺑﺮﮭﻜﻟا     
Water. ءﺎﻤﻟا     
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Drinkable water. هﺎﯿﻤﻟا ﺔﺤﻟﺎﺼﻟا بﺮﺸﻠﻟ     
Transportation. تﻼﺻاﻮﻤﻟا     
Other expenses. ىﺮﺧا ﻒﯾرﺎﺼﻣ     
Total. عﻮﻤﺠﻤﻟا     
Was any member of the household working on the informal sector in your country of origin? Which members were 
working in the informal sector?  
؟ﻮھ ﻦﻣ؟ﺎﯾرﻮﺳ ﻲﻓ ﮫﺻﺎﺨﻟا ﮫﺑﺎﺴﺤﻟ ﻞﻤﻌﯾ ةﺮﺳﻻا داﺮﻓا ﻦﻣ دﺮﻓ يا نﺎﻛ ﻞھ 
  
Is any member of the households working on the informal sector? What members of your family are currently working in 
the informal sector?  
؟ ﻮھ ﻦﻣ ؟صﺎﺨﻟا ﮫﺑﺎﺴﺤﻟ ﺎﯿﻟﺎﺣ ةﺮﺳﻻا داﺮﻓا ﻦﻣ دﺮﻓ  يا ﻞﻤﻌﯾ ﻞھ 
  
Did you used to run a business in country of origin?  
؟ كﺪﻠﺑ ﻲﻓ ﻼﻤﻋ ﺮﯾﺪﺗ ﺖﻨﻛ ﻞھ 
  
Do you currently run a business?  
؟ ﺎﻨھ ﻼﻤﻋ ﺮﯾﺪﺗ ﻞھ 
  
Did you use to have more than one job at a time in your country?  
؟ﺎﯾرﻮﺳ ﻲﻓ ﻞﻤﻋ ﻦﻣ ﺮﺜﻛا ﻞﻤﻌﺗ ﺖﻨﻛ ﻞھ 
  
How many jobs do you tend to have at time in here?  
؟ﺎﯿﻟﺎﺣ ﻞﻤﻋ ﻦﻣ ﺮﺜﻛا ﻞﻤﻌﺗ ﻞھ 
  
How long was your weekly working time in your country of origin?  
؟ﺎﯾرﻮﺳ ﻲﻓ ﻚﻠﻤﻋ تﺎﻋﺎﺳ ﻎﻠﺒﺗ ﺖﻧﺎﻛ ﻢﻛ 
  
How long is your weekly working time here?  
؟ ﺎﻨھ عﻮﺒﺳﻻا ﻲﻓ ﻞﻤﻌﺗ ﮫﻋﺎﺳ ﻢﻛ 
  
Were you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with your job in your country?  
؟ كﺪﻠﺑ ﻲﻓ ﻚﻠﻤﻋ ﻦﻋ اﺪﺑا ﻊﻨﺘﻘﻣ ﺮﯿﻏ , ﻊﻨﺘﻘﻣﺮﯿﻏ , ﻲﺿار, ﺎﻣﺎﻤﺗ ﻊﻨﺘﻘﻣ ﺖﻨﻛ ﻞھ 
  
Are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with your job in this country?  
؟ ﺎﻨھ ﻚﻠﻤﻋ ﻦﻋ اﺪﺑا ﻊﻨﺘﻘﻣ ﺮﯿﻏ , ﻊﻨﺘﻘﻣ ﺮﯿﻏ , ﻲﺿار , ﺎﻣﺎﻤﺗ ﻊﻨﺘﻘﻣ ﺖﻧا ﻞھ  
  
VI. Psychological Data 
General Happiness:  “All things considered, how happy would you say you are today?” (0-10) ﻢﯿﯿﻘﺗ ﻢﻛ  ﻚﺗدﺎﻌﺳ
ﻦﻣ ﺎﯿﻟﺎﺣ10؟ 
  
General Optimism: “All things considered, how hopeful do you feel about the future?” (0-10)  ﻚﻠﺋﺎﻔﺗ ﺔﺒﺴﻧ ﻲھ ﻢﻛ
 ﻦﻣ ﻞﺒﻘﺘﺴﻤﻟا ﻲﻓ10؟ 
  
VII. Security Data 
Do you consider that current situation of security of your family is very bad, bad, regular, good or very good?  
اﺪﺟ ﺪﯿﺟ,ﺪﯿﺟ,ﻲﻌﯿﺒط,ﺊﯿﺳ,اﺪﺟ ﺊﯿﺳ.. ﻚﺗﺮﺳا داﺮﻓاو ﺖﻧا ﺎﻨھ نﺎﻣﻻﺎﺑ رﻮﻌﺸﻟا 
  
Who is responsible for the security of your family? 
 ا ﻦﻋ لوﺆﺴﻤﻟا ﻮھ ﻦﻣ؟ﺔﻠﺋﺎﻌﻟا ﻦﻣ 
  
If something negative would happened to your family to who would you call first? Who will be your second choice? Who 
would be your third choice?  
؟ﺎﺜﻟﺎﺛ؟ﺎﯿﻧﺎﺛ؟ﻻواا ﺎﺠﻠﺗ ﻦﻤﻟ ﺔﻠﺋﺎﻌﻟا ﻊﻣ ﺔﻠﻜﺸﻣ يأ ثوﺪﺣ لﺎﺣ ﻲﻓ 
      
Do you think your family is safer now than before?  
؟نﻻا ﺎﻧﺎﻣا ﺮﺜﻛا ﻚﺘﻠﺋﺎﻋ نا ﺪﻘﺘﻌﺗ ﻞھ 
  
Do you consider that your personal current situation of security is very bad, bad, regular, good or very 
good?  
اﺪﺟ ﺪﯿﺟ,ﺪﯿﺟ,ﻲﻌﯿﺒط,ﺊﯿﺳ,اﺪﺟ ﺊﯿﺳ.. ﺎﻨھ نﺎﻣﻻﺎﺑ كرﻮﻌﺷ 
  
Who is responsible for your personal security?  
؟ﻚﻨﻣا ﻦﻋ لوﺆﺴﻤﻟا ﻮھ ﻦﻣ 
  
If something negative were to happen to you to whom would you call first? Who would be your second choice? Who 
would be your third choice?  
ﯿﻧﺎﺛ؟ﻻوا ﺄﺠﻠﺗ ﻦﻤﻟ.. ﻚﻌﻣ ﺔﻠﻜﺸﻣ ثوﺪﺣ لﺎﺣ ﻲﻓ؟ﺎﺜﻟﺎﺛ؟ ﺎ 
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I understand that participation in this survey is strictly and completely voluntary. I understand that all 
information collected will be kept confidential and used only for research purposes. I am willingly participating 
in this survey and answering the questions to the best of my ability. 
 
Date: ______________________ 
      
Do you feel safer now than before?  
؟ﺎﯿﻟﺎﺣ ﺎﻧﺎﻣا ﺮﺜﻛا ﻚﻧا ﺮﻌﺸﺗ ﻞھ 
  
All things considered, how integrated you think your family is now?(0-10).  
 ﻦﻣ10, ؟ ﻚﺘﻠﺋﺎﻋ جﺎﻣﺪﻧا ىﺪﻣ ﻮھﺎﻣ 
  
All thing considered, how integrated you think you are now? (0-10).  
ﻦﻣ10 ؟ ﻚﺟﺎﻣﺪﻧا ىﺪﻣ ﻮھ ﺎﻣ 
  
VIII. Shocks 
Have you experienced any decrease in your income since your arrival (increase in prices, reduction of 
assistance, reductions of remittances)?  
ﻞھ تاﺪﻋﺎﺴﻤﻟا ﻢﺠﺣ ﻞﯿﻠﻘﺗ,رﺎﻌﺳا ةدﺎﯾز) ﻚﻟﻮﺻو ﺬﻨﻣ ﻚﻠﺧد ﻲﻓ ضﺎﻔﺨﻧا يﻷ ﺖﺿﺮﻌﺗ,...) 
  
  
What was the cause of this decrease?  
؟ضﺎﻔﺨﻧﻻا اﺬھ ﺐﺒﺳ ﻮھ ﺎﻣ 
  
Have you experienced any theft since your arrival?  
 ﺮﺧا ﻲﻓ ﺔﻗﺮﺴﻠﻟ ﺖﺿﺮﻌﺗ ﻞھ6 ؟ رﻮﮭﺷ 
  
Have you experienced a loss of employment since your arrival?     
Have any of your family members had any sickness during the last 6 months?  
 ﺮﮭﺷﻻا لﻼﺧ ضﺮﻤﻟا عاﻮﻧا ﻦﻣ عﻮﻧ يﻻ ﻚﺘﻠﺋﺎﻋ داﺮﻓا ﻦﻣ يا ضﺮﻌﺗ ﻞھ6 ؟ ةﺮﯿﺧﻻا  
  
What kind of sickness?  
؟ ضﺮﻤﻟا عﻮﻧ ﻮھ ﺎﻣ 
  
Which of these options correspond to your response to the previous shocks (answer Y for yes or N for no): 
Increase your weekly working time   Use savings   
Have more than one job   Request for a loan or credit   
Request one of your children to start working   Request any kind of assistance   
Reduce household’s food intake   Sell assets   
Reduce household’s consumption   Reduce in education spending   
Request one of the members of the family to start working in the informal sector   
If one of your answers is assistance, please explain who is providing assistance and 
how?  
؟ ﻚﻟ ةﺪﻋﺎﺴﻤﻟا ﻢﯾﺪﻘﺘﺑ مﺎﻗ ﻦﻣ ﺢﺿو ﻚﻠﻀﻓ ﻦﻣ , ةﺪﻋﺎﺴﻤﻟا ﺐﻠط ﻰﻟا تﺄﺠﻟ ﺪﻗ ﺖﻨﻛ اذا 
    
If your answer is none of the previous alternatives please explain your actual response.  
 ؟ ﻚﻠﻌﻓ ةدر ﺖﻧﺎﻛ ﻒﯿﻛ ﺢﺿو ﻚﻠﻀﻓ ﻦﻣ ﺮﻛذ ﺎﻤﻣ ءﻲﺷ ﻻ ﻚﺘﺑﺎﺟا ﺖﻧﺎﻛ اذا 
  
Is there any other shock that you have experienced here that is not included in the survey?  
 ﻞھ؟ ﺔﺳارﺪﻟا ﻲﻓ ﺎھﺮﻛذ ﻢﺘﯾ ﻢﻟو ﺎﮭﻟ ﺖﺿﺮﻌﺗ تﺎﻣﺪﺼﻟا عاﻮﻧا ﻦﻣ عﻮﻧ يا كﺎﻨھ  
  
Do you think that this survey captures your situation?  
؟ ﻚﻌﺿو ﻲﻄﻐﺗ ﺔﺳارﺪﻟا هﺬھ نا ﺪﻘﺘﻌﺗ ﻞھ 
  
Do you think that this survey is too intrusive?  
؟ ﺔﯿﻟﻮﻀﻓ ﺔﺳارﺪﻟا هﺬھ نا ﺪﻘﺘﻌﺗ ﻞھ 
  
